







Abstract: The paper explores the status of unilateral humanitarian interventions in international law. 
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force, except in case of self
collective action authorized by the Security Council. The question i
unilateral humanitarian intervention among these exceptions means that they are not in conformity 
with the Charter and if so, whether the right to such interventions exists as the part of customary law. 
The issue has become even more controversial after the adoption of the “responsibility to protect” 
principle. Findings of legal scholars on this issue differ significantly. This paper analyzes and 
interprets the Charter provisions in order to answer the question of compatibilit
interventions with the Charter and examines the state practice in order to conclude whether the 
customary law rule allowing the humanitarian intervention exists. The conclusion of the paper is that 
there is no evidence to support the cont
authorization are permissible, although there are elements which point to the possibility of the 
creation of customary law allowing them.
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1. Introduction 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention denotes a military intervention undertaken by 
one or more states on the territory of another state in order to prevent massive 
human rights violations in the latter state. The legality of this type of inter
represents one of the most controversial issues in contemporary international law, 
primarily due to the fact that they are undertaken without the prior Security 
Council authorization.2  
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Humanitarian intervention consists of two potentially conflicting concepts: one is 
the concept of human rights and the other is the concept of intervention, closely 
connected to that of state sovereignty. On one hand, states are beyond any doubt 
obliged to pay respect for human rights. Such an obligation falls within the group 
of erga omnes obligations, that is those obligations directed towards international 
community as a whole. On the other hand, international law forbids an intervention 
in the internal affairs of other states, thus preserving their sovereignty. 
Although humanitarian interventions are no novelty in state practice, the issue of 
their legality became particularly present after the adoption of the UN Charter and 
outlawing the use of force. The Charter provides for two exceptions to such a 
prohibition – a self-defence and a collective action authorized by the Security 
Council. Humanitarian intervention is thus not provided as an exception to the use 
of force and is therefore generally considered by many to be illegal. 
Yet, the situation is not that simple. The collective security system established by 
the Charter has a flaw. The right of veto of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, which was intended to provide that the most important decisions 
regarding the international peace and security are reached with the consensus of the 
most powerful states in the world, serves more often than not as a means of 
blocking the Security Council in performing its functions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. The United States (usually supported by the United Kingdom and France) 
and Russia (usually supported by China) are regularly being divided on questions 
regarding the international peace and security and due to their opposing attitudes it 
is difficult to agree on resolutions condemning certain actions or even more 
authorizing the use of force. In spite of the fact that humanitarian intervention is 
not provided as an exception to the use of force in the Charter, some commentators 
believe that it is not contrary to the Charter either. This paper will explore whether 
humanitarian interventions can indeed be considered to be compatible with the 
Charter and if not, is there a customary law right which allows undertaking of such 
a type of interventions. 
 
2. The Prohibition of Intervention and the Concept of State Sovereignty 
It is a well-established principle of international law that intervention in the internal 
affairs of another sovereign state is prohibited. It was stipulated in the Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States,1 in the Friendly Relations Declaration1 
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and in two Declarations on the Inadmissibility of Intervention.2 The UN Charter 
states that “nothing … shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” except in case 
of application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.3 The principle was 
confirmed in the judicial practice as well.4 
In spite of the general acceptance of the non-intervention principle, in recent years 
there have been contentions that due to the changed concept of the state 
sovereignty, some forms of intervention might exceptionally be permitted. 
According to this line of reasoning, the protection of human rights does not fall 
within the domaine réservé of a particular state. (Vesel, 2003, p. 6) The concept of 
“popular sovereignty” is based on the idea that external intervention to depose an 
oppressive regime would not violate sovereignty but rather would restore 
sovereignty to the people. (Reisman, 1995, p. 872) This seemingly benign concept 
challenges the very substance of statehood in international law. (Burton, 1996, p. 
424) 
To be sure, the classical concept of state sovereignty has changed over time. The 
globalization of the world has had an influence on that process. The fact is that 
states with non-democratic regimes, in which rights of their own people are being 
violated, have become a matter of concern of the entire international community. 
Trends towards the modernization of the concept of sovereignty have brought into 
question the notion of sovereignty as the absolute control over a certain territory 
and have affirmed an obligation of the sovereign to rule in a way that certain basic 
principles, among which are the concern for the welfare of the citizens and respect 
for their human rights, are being taken care of.  
Still, in spite of the fact that the concept of state sovereignty is gradually evolving, 
there is no solid ground to claim that the state practice has influenced customary 
law in a way that sovereignty could be derogated. So far, the only exception to the 
derogation of state sovereignty is, as stated in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the 
undertaking of the collective action authorized by the Security Council. 
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3. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter 
3.1. Interpretation of the UN Charter 
The UN Charter has established a new legal order regarding the use of force. It has 
almost entirely outlawed the use of force and has provided for only two exceptions 
to such prohibition. Although there is no explicit ban of the humanitarian 
intervention in the Charter, it has not been provided among the exceptions to the 
use of force either. That is why humanitarian interventions have mainly been 
considered illegal. (Benjamin, 1992-1993, p. 120)  
However, there are contentions that humanitarian interventions are not necessarily 
contrary to the Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter states that “all members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. The 
proponents of humanitarian intervention allege that such interventions are directed 
neither against territorial sovereignty nor against political independence of any 
state. Also, they claim that humanitarian interventions are consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely with the Charter provisions 
promoting the protection of human rights.1 
Such contentions are unacceptable for at least two reasons.  
Firstly, the travaux préparatoires of the Charter show that the initial draft of the 
Charter did not even contain the phrase “against territorial integrity and political 
independence”, meaning that the focus was not set on it. It was inserted later at the 
insistence of smaller states, which feared for their integrity and independence. 
(Chesterman, 2001, p. 49) Such an interpretation was in a certain manner 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice, which ruled in the Corfu Channel 
Case that although the action of minesweeping undertaken by the United Kingdom 
threatened neither the territorial sovereignty nor the political independence of 
Albania, the operation nevertheless violated Albania’s sovereignty. 
The phrase was, therefore, inserted not to limit, but rather to strengthen the 
prohibition of the use of force. 
Secondly, it cannot be asserted that humanitarian interventions are not covered by 
the prohibition of Article 2(4) with the argument that they are – by promoting 
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human rights – not “in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations”. Again, the phrase did not seem to have been 
intended to limit the scope of the prohibition of the use of force, but to emphasize 
that any force which is directed against principles and purposes of the United 
Nations, among which the maintenance of peace and security is the most important 
one, is forbidden. If one should have to decide on the primacy of principles 
promulgated by the Charter, deciding on peace and security on one side and the 
protection of human rights on the other side, it seems that priority should be given 
to the former. The analysis of the Charter text, as well as the primary intention of 
its adoption, suggest that peace is the highest value promulgated by the Charter. 
Legal writers are prone to believe that human rights have not been given the same 
significance as the maintenance of peace. (O’Connell, 1998, p. 473) Such hierarchy 
has implicitly been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, which 
highlighted in its judgment on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo that 
the prohibition of force represents the cornerstone of the UN Charter.1 Besides, the 
protection of human rights can be achieved in many other ways other than the use 
of force. 
 
3.2. Should the Right to Humanitarian Intervention be Legally Regulated? 
In the debates on humanitarian intervention it has been suggested that leaving such 
an important issue outside the reach of international law is highly problematic and 
that the right to humanitarian intervention should therefore be regulated. 
(Richemond, 2003, p. 51) 
The proponents of this idea point to some benefits that would arise out of such 
regulation. Two main benefits of regulation are being pointed out. First, it is 
sustained that setting the clear criteria for undertaking legitimate humanitarian 
intervention would impede states’ ability to assert humanitarian rationales for 
illegitimate intervention. (Burton, 1996, p. 420) In this way, pretextual 
interventions could be avoided. In that case, undertaking humanitarian 
interventions would no longer be a subjective decision of states undertaking it and 
states would be allowed to act only if all of the necessary conditions are fulfilled. 
And second, regulation would restrain intervention by altruistic and well-
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intentioned states that, in the absence of an objective standard, might misjudge the 
appropriateness of intervention. (Burton, 1996, p. 420) 
The proposal of regulation has on the other hand raised doubts as to the potential 
abuses of the right to humanitarian intervention. The intention of the Charter was to 
limit the use of force as much as possible. Introducing new exceptions to the use of 
force would mean making the use of force system more flexible, which is a 
somewhat risky undertaking. In spite of all that, the question nevertheless remains 
whether the fear of potential abuses should be a ban on legal regulation. The world 
has witnessed, for instance, numerous abuses of the right to self-defense, whereby 
states have invoked this right in circumstances which clearly did not form the basis 
for self-defense. Yet, these abuses are not the result of the codification of the right 
to self-defense. Codifying this right in the UN Charter only could have made the 
criteria for its undertaking stricter than they were before the codification. That is 
why legal regulation of humanitarian intervention, whereby strict conditions for its 
undertaking would be laid down, would be welcomed. But the question is how to 
make that happen, knowing that the formal modification of the UN Charter is not 
such an easy task. Article 108 of the Charter states that amendments to the Charter 
shall come into force for all members of the United Nations when they have been 
adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and 
ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of 
the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the 
Security Council. It is very difficult to imagine that such a controversial issue as 
humanitarian intervention could be agreed upon in a manner provided by the 
Charter. So, it seems more likely that the right to humanitarian intervention 
develops within customary law, if the state practice on that matter becomes 
frequent and general, and if that state practice is accompanied by the belief in its 
binding nature (opinio juris). 
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4. Humanitarian Intervention and Customary International Law 
In order for a rule to be a customary law rule, two preconditions must be fulfilled: 
there has to be a widespread and systematic practice and there has to be opinio 
juris, that is, the belief in the legally binding nature of such practice. In 
determining whether a customary rule to humanitarian intervention exists, both 
elements have to be examined.  
One of the most frequently mentioned cases of humanitarian intervention is the one 
undertaken in 1999 by NATO forces in Yugoslavia. The international community 
refused to articulate a legal argument for that humanitarian intervention. States had 
taken different positions with regard to intervention: some refused to justify it, 
others expressed discomfort about the action being contrary to Article 2(4), while 
some of them marked the action as “illegal but legitimate”. (Williams, Stuart, 
2007-2008, p. 102) 
In the 20th century there was a substantial number of interventions which were 
allegedly directed towards saving human lives. They were practically without 
exception condemned by the international community, in this way or another. Let 
us take, for instance, examples of the United States interventions in Grenada in 
1983 and in Panama in 1989. The intervention in Grenada was undertaken out of 
allegedly humanitarian reason, although the final goal was the change of regime in 
that country. The Security Council failed to formally condemn the action due to the 
United States veto. However, the intervention was condemned by the General 
Assembly, which labeled the action as a “flagrant violation of international law”.1 
Similar scenario took place in Panama. The United States came out with several 
justifications for the action: from self-defense and the need to preserve democracy, 
to humanitarian reasons, primarily rescuing of its nationals. Again was the 
resolution condemning the action blocked by vetoes, but the General Assembly 
condemned the action by the significant majority of votes.2 
Several interventions occurred in the 70s of the 20th century: Intervention of India 
in East Pakistan (1971), intervention of Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978-1979), 
intervention of France in the Central African Empire (1979), intervention of 
Tanzania in Uganda (1979). 
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Practically neither one of these instances of the use of force was approved by the 
international community. Perhaps the case of Indian intervention in East Pakistan 
came closest to being recognized as justified, however it seems odd that India did 
not even base its action on humanitarian reasons, but rather on the argument of 
self-defence. Intervention of Vietnam in Kampuchea was not condemned by the 
Security Council due to the Soviet veto, but the General Assembly expressed its 
condemnation by inviting all foreign forces to withdraw from Kampuchea and by 
calling upon all states to refrain from all acts or threats of aggression and all forms 
of interference in the internal affairs of states in South-East Asia.1  
It is somewhat difficult to talk about the approval or disapproval of the 
international community vis-à-vis humanitarian interventions because many of the 
so-called humanitarian interventions were in fact illegal uses of force undertaken in 
order to accomplish some other goals. It is difficult therefore to discern which 
interventions were indeed “purely” humanitarian. (Franck, 2002, p. 135) 
Be it as it may, it cannot be proved that there exists a general state practice with 
regard to unilateral humanitarian interventions. First of all, these interventions are 
always undertaken by powerful states against the weaker ones. Besides, even the 
practice of the powerful states is not uniform. While these states sometimes find it 
necessary to intervene in the name of human rights, in some situations, like for 
instance in Georgia or Chechnya, gross violations of human rights draw no such 
attention of these states. The overview of the state practice shows that there is 
neither general state practice necessary for the creation of customary law, nor is 
there an opinio juris. The lack of opinio juris can, among other things, be seen 
from the fact that in 1999 the foreign ministers of the G-77 group have adopted the 
Declaration in which they rejected “the so-called right of humanitarian 
intervention, which had no basis in the UN Charter or in international law”.2 This 
was the opinion of 132 member states.  
All of this does not mean that such a customary law rule could not develop in the 
future, should the necessary requirements for the emergence of such a rule be 
fulfilled. 
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5. Responsibility to Protect 
In the discussions on humanitarian intervention, it has been asserted that the term 
“humanitarian intervention” is completely inadequate because it brings together 
two contradictory terms – “humanitarian” and (military) “intervention”. (Siebert, 
2003, p. 60) The ICRC, for instance, seeks to promote the term “armed 
intervention in response to grave violations of human rights and of international 
humanitarian law”.1 Recently, there has been a rhetorical shift from humanitarian 
intervention into the “responsibility to protect”.  
The responsibility to protect concept originated in the international community's 
failures to respond adequately to massive human rights abuses, like those in 
Rwanda and Bosnia. While the case of Rwanda exposed the lack of a political will 
to intervene, Bosnia revealed the horror of inadequate intervention. (Mohamed, 
2012, p. 320) 
Reacting to such crises, the than-Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed in his 
2000 Millennium Report to the General Assembly the problem of reconciling the 
principle of sovereignty with the need to protect human rights.2 An attempt to 
answer that question was given by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its 2001 report “The Responsibility to Protect” 
(RtoP).3 The main idea of the RtoP concept is that each state is responsible for the 
protection of its people, and when the state fails to provide such protection, the 
international community is obliged to do so instead. Understood this way, the 
intervention would not contradict, but rather complete the state sovereignty. 
(Levitt, 2003-2004, p. 157) 
The advocates of the permissibility of unilateral humanitarian interventions found 
in the newly coined concept of RtoP an argument in favor of their contentions. 
However, it seems that the RtoP concept does not differ significantly from what 
has traditionally been called humanitarian intervention. There are two main 
differences: first, the RtoP signifies the obligation, whereas humanitarian 
intervention is regarded as a right, and second, the RtoP refers to a wider range of 
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activities of the intervening states (RtoP refers not only to the responsibility to 
react, but also to responsibility to prevent and to rebuild). Apart from that, it seems 
that the concept has brought nothing new with regard to holders of that right. The 
Report stresses the primary role of the Security Council in authorizing military 
actions. Since the Security Council was even before authorized by the Charter to 
give authorizations for military actions, the Report solely confirms an already 
existing right. The Report further mentions the role of regional organizations under 
the Charter, but points out that their military actions ought to be taken with the 
Security Council authorization. The Report also refers to the General Assembly 
responsibility under the Charter for peace and security matters, as well as its power 
to act pursuant to the Uniting for Peace resolution. Although the Report repeatedly 
highlights the primary role of the Security Council in authorizing the use of force, 
it concludes that undertaking unilateral military actions by the ad hoc coalitions in 
situations in which the action is truly needed and the Security Council is 
deadlocked by veto, undermines the authority of the Security Council. It is not 
quite clear from the Report whether the intention of such a finding was merely to 
state the facts, not bringing into question the exclusive authority of the Security 
Council in authorizing the use of force, or was it a gateway towards the 
authorization of the unilateral use of force. 
The RtoP concept has been discussed on several occasions, but answers as to the 
holders of the right have not been given. The Outcome Document of the 2005 
World Summit confirmed the RtoP principle, but only with regard to the use of 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. The states also 
expressed preparedness for the collective action in cases in which national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, but only through the 
Security Council. 1 
Within the United Nations, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change stated that there is an emerging norm of a collective international 
responsibility to protect, but exercisable by the Security Council authorizing 
military intervention.2 The RtoP principle was confirmed and elaborated by the UN 
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Secretary-General as well.1 Although the principle was with no doubt recognized 
within the international community, it remained quite ambiguous. First, it is not 
clear whether it represents a legal or a moral duty of states. And second, it has not 
gone any further from emphasizing the role of the Security Council in authorizing 
the use of force. The ICISS Report boldly intended to impose the duty upon states 
to react militarily in case of massive abuses of human rights in other states, but 
reactions to that Report, as the one expressed in the World Summit Outcome 
Document, show the caution in rhetoric, which can be interpreted as states’ 
unwillingness to accept the RtoP concept as nothing more than their right (not their 
responsibility!), provided it was authorized by the Security Council. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The conclusion of the illegality of unilateral humanitarian intervention appears to 
be a logical one. To claim that such interventions could be subsumed under the UN 
Charter would be quite unpersuasive. It cannot be asserted that this right exists 
under customary law either. The practice of states necessary for the creation of 
such a right is neither general, nor consistent and there is a complete lack of a 
subjective element, that is, the opinio juris. 
It would be quite simple to conclude that unilateral humanitarian interventions are 
illegitimate, while those undertaken with the Security Council authorization are 
permitted. However, the world has witnessed on many occasions that the Security 
Council did not react promptly or in no way to situations in which it was expected 
to. Yet, human rights atrocities within certain states do occur and it would be 
inappropriate to simply state that states will stand by and watch these atrocities 
happen without doing anything to stop them. It seems that what is legitimate is not 
at the same time legal in this case. An attempt has been made to overcome this gap 
between legitimacy and legality by introducing the RtoP concept. This shift from 
humanitarian intervention to RtoP has not solved the problem though. The RtoP 
concept remained highly ambiguous, being interpreted by each body somewhat 
differently. In sum, it has not been clearly articulated what the RtoP really means – 
is it a moral, a political or a legal category. And what is most important, there is no 
answer as to who is entitled to exercise this right. Are the individual states, or 
group of states, or international organizations allowed to do so in the absence of the 
Security Council action? 
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For the time being, there is no evidence that states understand RtoP as a positive 
duty to act under international law, which means that the introduction of the 
concept has in fact brought nothing new to the international law system. But even 
though the RtoP is at present a political, rather than a legal concept, it might 
gradually evolve into a customary law norm, should the necessary requirements be 
fulfilled. Until then, it only seems right to try to strengthen the efficiency of the 
Security Council in performing its functions under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
When speaking of delicate issues such as the use of force, institutionalization 
appears to be the best mechanism to avoid abuses of that right and to avoid auto-
interpretation of circumstances giving rise to the use of force. 
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